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Inverse agreement and Hungarian verb paradigms
Abstract I propose a solution for the lack of agreement with ﬁrst and second
person pronouns in the Hungarian objective paradigm. Following Béjar &
Rezac (2009) and É. Kiss (2013), I suggest that Cyclic Agree gives rise to an
Inverse Agreement system in Hungarian, in which the verb shows intransitive
agreement in cases where the object has equally or more highly speciﬁed fea-
tures than the subject. The appearance of the second person agreement sufﬁx
only with ﬁrst person but not third subjects is given a principled syntactic ex-
planation. All personal pronouns are argued to trigger agreement in person
and number, with some instances, namely inverse ones, not spelled out due
to the interaction of Cyclic Agree and the feature speciﬁcations of Hungarian
personal pronouns.
1 Introduction: an agreement puzzle
Hungarian has two transitive verb paradigms, one of which only appears with
certain types of direct objects. In the literature, these are usually referred to
as the subjective or indeﬁnite paradigm (glossed SUBJ) on the one hand and
the objective or deﬁnite paradigm (glossed OBJ) on the other. These terms
emphasise different aspects: the terms objective and deﬁnite refer to the fact
that this verb paradigm references a property of not just the subject, but also the
direct object, and that this property is related to deﬁniteness. The subjective
or indeﬁnite paradigm not only appears with transitives, but also with verbs
that do not take a direct object.
Examples of the two paradigms are shown in (1) and (2), illustrating that
direct objects of different kinds require different verb morphology. In (1),
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the indeﬁnite direct object egy kutyá-t ‘a dog-ACC’ requires the subjective
paradigm; in (2), the deﬁnite a kutyá-t ‘the dog-ACC’ requires the objective
paradigm.
(1) Lát-sz
see-2SG.SUBJ
egy
a
kutyá-t.
dog-ACC
‘You see a dog.’
(2) Lát-od
see-2SG.OBJ
a
the
kutyá-t.
dog-ACC
‘You see the dog.’
Themain point of this paper is to illustrate and analyse a gap in the distribution
of the objective paradigm. Personal pronoun direct objects would be expected
to trigger the objective paradigm, if the relevant property is indeed related to
deﬁniteness. Note that there is no agreement in the literature as to what exact
property of noun phrases triggers the objective paradigm, but it is often char-
acterised as “roughly” involving the deﬁniteness of the direct object (cf. den
Dikken 2004: 446, Coppock & Wechsler 2012: 700). It has been suggested
that the trigger is the syntactic structure of the direct object (cf. Bartos 1999),
deﬁniteness agreement (den Dikken 2004, 2006), and agreement in a formal
feature, spelling out certain semantic properties of the objects (Coppock &
Wechsler 2012, Coppock 2013).
In this paper, I will not tackle the question of what triggers the objective
paradigm in general, but I will focus on its appearance given a small subset of
possible direct objects, namely personal pronouns (see the above references
for proposed solutions to the bigger question). The literature on the objective
paradigm can arguably be split into two camps: some authors argue that only
third person objects trigger the objective paradigm (cf. Coppock & Wechsler
2010, 2012, Coppock 2013, den Dikken 2004, 2006, Rocquet 2013) while
others are of the opinion that the objective paradigm should in principle extend
to other persons as well, notably the second person. The latter position is
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presented most clearly in a series of papers by Katalin É. Kiss (cf. É. Kiss
2003, 2005, 2013) as well as arguably Bartos (1999).
The analysis presented here falls into the second group, i.e. I will argue that
it is possible to analyse the Hungarian objective paradigm as expressing agree-
ment with (again, roughly) deﬁnite direct objects in person, but not number—
arguments for this view include distributional patterns in Hungarian as well
as cross-linguistic analogies.
The reason for the disagreement on the nature of agreement with personal
pronouns appears to lie in the distribution of verb paradigms when verbs take a
personal pronoun direct object. The following examples illustrate this. In (3),
the verb obligatorily appears in the objective paradigm, (3a), the subjective
paradigm being ungrammatical, (3b). (4) and (5) illustrate analogous cases
with different subjects. These examples give rise to the generalisation that
third person personal pronouns trigger the objective paradigm (I will come
back to one case where number might play a role in agreement in section 4.3.1
below).
(3) 1→ 3: O%-
a. Lát-om
see-1SG.OBJ
ő-t.
s/he-ACC
‘I see him/her.’
1→ 3: *68%-
b. *Lát-ok
see-1SG.SUBJ
ő-t.
s/he-ACC
intended: ‘I see him/her.’
(4) 2→ 3: O%-
a. Lát-od
see-2SG.OBJ
ő-t.
s/he-ACC
‘You (sg.) see him/her.’
2→ 3: *68%-
b. *Lát-sz
see-2SG.SUBJ
ő-t.
s/he-ACC
int.: ‘You (sg.) see him/her.’
(5) 3→ 3: O%-
a. Lát-ja
see-3SG.OBJ
ő-t.
s/he-ACC
‘S/he sees him/her.’
3→ 3: *68%-
b. *Lát-ø
see-3SG.SUBJ
ő-t.
s/he-ACC
int.: ‘S/he sees him/her.’
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The picture becomes less clear when the direct object personal pronoun has
a different person. First, the following examples show that with ﬁrst person
direct objects, the subjective paradigm appears and the objective paradigm is
ungrammatical.
(6) 2→ 1: 68%-
a. Lát-sz
see-2SG.SUBJ
engem.
I.SG.ACC
‘You see me.’
2→ 1: *O%-
b. *Lát-od
see-2SG.OBJ
engem.
I.SG.ACC
intended: ‘You see me.’
(7) 3→ 1: 68%-
a. Lát-ø
see-3SG.SUBJ
engem.
I.SG.ACC
‘S/he sees me.’
3→ 1: *O%-
b. *Lát-ja
see-3SG.OBJ
engem.
I.SG.ACC
intended: ‘S/he sees me.’
Finally, with second person pronouns, the verb endings vary. In some cases,
the verb appears in the subjective paradigm, while in others the verb ends in
one of the variants of the sufﬁx -lak/-lek, depending on vowel harmony. (8a)
shows this sufﬁx in the case of a ﬁrst person subject (dropped) and a second
person pronoun. (8b) indicates that the subjective paradigm is ungrammatical
here (as is the objective form *lát-om téged). (9), on the other hand, shows that
with a third person subject, a second person pronoun requires the subjective
paradigm, with the objective paradigm being ungrammatical.1
(8) 1→ 2: O%-
a. Lát-lak
see-1SG>2
téged.
you.SG.ACC
‘I see you (sg.).’
1→ 2: *68%-
b. *Lát-ok
see-1SG
téged.
you.SG.ACC
intended: ‘I see you (sg.).’
1For completeness, note that *Ő látlak téged with the inteded meaning of ‘S/he sees you.’
is ungrammatical as well.
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(9) 3→ 2: 68%-
a. Lát-ø
see-3SG.SUBJ
téged.
you.SG.ACC
‘S/he sees you.’
3→ 2: *O%-
b. *Lát-ja
see-3SG.OBJ
téged.
you.SG.ACC
intended: ‘S/he sees you.’
The appearance of the sufﬁx in (8a) and its absence in (8b) and (9) is the main
topic of this paper. I will argue, in line with É. Kiss (2013), that the above data
can be interpreted as showing that the appearance of object agreement depends
not only on properties of the object, but also on properties of the subject, i.e.
second person pronouns trigger object agreement with ﬁrst person subjects but
not with third person subjects.
Crucially, I analyse -lak/-lek as part of the objective paradigm. This entails
that the objective paradigm is not restricted to third person direct objects. A
ﬁrst argument for this is distributional: we have seen above that with third per-
son pronouns, whenever one paradigm is grammatical, the other one is ruled
out. Now, given (8), repeated here, one could argue that since the subject-
ive paradigm is ruled out, as shown by (8b), (8a) shows an instance of the
objective paradigm, represented by the suffix -lak in (9a).
(8) 1→ 2: O%-
a. Lát-lak
see-1SG>2.OBJ
téged.
you.SG.ACC
‘I see you (sg.).’
1→ 2: *68%-
b. *Lát-ok
see-1SG
téged.
you.SG.ACC
intended: ‘I see you (sg.).’
A seeming objection to this view is presented by (9), repeated here as well.
(9) 3→ 2: 68%-
a. Lát-ø
see-3SG.SUBJ
téged.
you.SG.ACC
‘S/he sees you.’
3→ 2: *O%-
b. *Lát-ja
see-3SG.OBJ
téged.
you.SG.ACC
intended: ‘S/he sees you.’
If -lak/-lek is part of the objective paradigm, i.e. agreement with second person
is possible (as I argue), why dowe not see it in (9)? One answer to this question
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has been put forth in a series of papers by Katalin É. Kiss (É. Kiss 2003, 2005,
2013) who argues that there is an inverse agreement constraint in Hungarian,
i.e. the person of the subject has to be taken into account for the distribution
of the objective paradigm (see also section 2.2).
This gives us a way of analysing the puzzle posed by (8) and (9): when the
subject is ﬁrst person, -lak/-lek appears, but not if the subject is third person.
In the latter case, we only see the subjective paradigm. One advantage of this
approach is that whenever the subjective paradigm is ungrammatical in the
above examples, one can say that the verb is in the objective paradigm, and
-lak/-lek is not “special” in any sense. I will propose a full analysis of this
distribution in section 4.
Throughout the discussion, I will leave the case of reflexive pronouns aside
— these are formally third person and behave like other third person pronouns
(cf. Bartos 1999: 104, Coppock & Wechsler 2012: 704).2
This paper is structured as follows. Section 2 introduces the agreement pat-
tern in more detail and relates it to inverse agreement patterns in other lan-
guages. Section 3 relates agreement in the pronominal domain to the wider
domain of object agreement in Hungarian. Section 4 fleshes out the analysis
2Reflexives seem to consist of the root mag- ‘core, kernel’ and a possessive sufﬁx, though,
as a reviewer points out, these sufﬁxes are not the synchronically productive ones. Never-
theless, reflexives show third person properties: they can control third person possessive
sufﬁxes, as in (i) from Hungarian author István Örkény’s story Férﬁarckép, part of the
collection Egyperces novellák:
(i) Mindez-t
all this-ACC
a
the
mag-am
self-1SG
ere-jé-ből
power-36*.3O66-ELA
értem
achieved
el.
‘I achieved all this with my own powers.’
The reflexive magam ‘myself’ controls possessor agreement on erejéből ‘power’, whose
possessive sufﬁx is third person singular, not ﬁrst person.
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and discusses the relation between the present proposal and other analyses.
Section 5 concludes the paper.
2 Inverse agreement in Hungarian
I interpret the distribution of paradigms with personal pronoun direct objects
above to be dependent on the person of both subject and direct object. The
resulting pattern is not random but can be characterised using the notion of
inverse agreement, i.e. the subjective paradigm arises with personal pronouns
if subject and object are in an inverse conﬁguration. In this section, I will
briefly introduce the notion of inverse agreement before going on to provide
an analysis the pattern illustrated above.
2.1 The notion of inverse agreement
(10) illustrates a simple person hierarchy as used in a wide range of literature
(also as part of more extensive scales, cf. Silverstein 1976, Comrie 1980,
Aissen 2003 among others). An inverse conﬁguration of subject and direct
object results when the value of the person of the direct object is higher on the
scale than the value of the person of the subject.
(10) ﬁrst person > second person > third person
For example, a third person subject and a ﬁrst person direct object are in an
inverse conﬁguration, because the person of the subject is lower on the scale
in (10) than that of the direct object. I will refer to such conﬁgurations as
inverse. Any conﬁguration that is not inverse will be called non-inverse.3
3Conﬁgurations in which the person of the subject is higher than the person of the object
can be called direct. Non-inverse allows us to include conﬁgurations like 3→ 3, in which
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When it comes to inverse agreement phenomena, it is not just the position
of one argument on this scale that plays a role but the relative position of two
arguments. Certain phenomena arise only when the values of both the subject
and the object are in certain conﬁgurations. In fact, what has been character-
ised as inverse conﬁgurations above, namely the higher position of the direct
object relative to the subject on (10), shows up in a range of languages as
a context that triggers or licenses certain syntactic or morphological expres-
sions whose appearance depends on the particular conﬁguration of the person
of subject and object.
To illustrate a relevant instance of an inverse conﬁguration triggering spe-
cial morphology, consider the following examples from Chukchi, discussed
in Comrie (1980) and Bobaljik & Branigan (2006). Chukchi is a Western
Siberian ergative language showing agreement with both the subject and the
object in transitive clauses. There is a preﬁx ine-, referred to as a “detransit-
ivizing preﬁx” by Comrie (1980: 64) and an antipassive marker in Bobaljik
& Branigan (2006: 48f.), which usually shows up when an absolutive object
is demoted to an oblique; if the sentence was transitive, agreement and case
marking become intransitive (cf. Bobaljik & Branigan 2006: 48). (11) illus-
trates this contrast (here SUB and OBJ refer to subject and object agreement):
(11) a. ʔaaček-a
youth-ERG
kimitʔ-ən
load-ABS
ne-nłʔetet-ən
3PL.SUB-carry-3SG.OBJ
‘(The) young men carried away the load’
b. ʔaaček-ət
youth-PL(ABS)
ine-nłʔetet-ɣʔet
AP-carry-3PL.SUB
kimitʔ-e
load-INSTR
‘(The) young men carried away a load’
(Kozinsky et al. 1988: 652, cited in Bobaljik & Branigan 2006: 48f.)
both the subject and the object are on the same level of the scale; cf. section 4.3.2 for other
configurations involving the same person.
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In certain conﬁgurations, however, a proper subset of inverse conﬁgurations
of the person of subject and object, object agreement is suspended and the
verb appears in what seems to be an intransitive verb form (cf. Bobaljik &
Branigan 2006: 49).
(12) a. ine-lʔu-gʔi
AP-see-2SG?.SUB
‘thou sawest me’
b. ine-lʔu-gʔi
AP-see-3SG.SUB
‘he saw me’
c. ine-lʔu-tək
AP-see-2PL.SUB
‘you saw me’ (Comrie 1980: 65, glosses added4)
(13) ə-nan
he-ERG
ɣəm
I.ABS
ø-ine-łʔu-ɣʔi
3SG.SUB-AP-see-3SG.SUB
‘He saw me.’5
(Skorik 1977: 44, cited in Bobaljik & Branigan 2006: 49)
While the examples in (12) and (13) are still transitive, the subject bearing
ergative and the object bearing absolutive case, the verb form appears as if
there were no direct object present. This is indicated by the appearance of
ine- as well as the two subject agreement afﬁxes.6
In Bobaljik & Branigan (2006), this is explained by assuming that when
two arguments enter an Agree relation with the same head in Chukchi, certain
conﬁgurations of the features involved have to be removed. These are 3SG →
1SG, as well as 2→ 1, indicating the person and number of the subject and the
direct object, respectively (cf. Bobaljik & Branigan 2006: 68).
4Because Comrie (1980: 65) reports the same form and meaning for (12a) and (12b), I
glossed the 2SG suffix in (12a) with a question mark.
5The different spelling of g/ɣ and l/ł is irrelevant for present purposes.
6Bobaljik & Branigan (2006: 48, 56) mention that in general Chukchi verbs have two agree-
ment slots. The sufﬁx agrees with the subject and the object or both in transitives and with
the subject in intransitives and the faux transitives in question.
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This explanation illustrates two issues which are relevant to the present dis-
cussion: the ﬁrst is the nature of the generalisation over the offending con-
ﬁgurations of subject and object. In Chukchi, only a speciﬁc subset of inverse
cases is affected, with dialectal variation. Bobaljik & Branigan (2006) thus
suggest that there are certain gaps in the relevant paradigms. Hungarian (and
other languages) provide us with data where the “gaps” seem to be subject to
simpler generalisations. I will show that in Hungarian, the relevant conﬁgur-
ations include all of those that are inverse.
The second issue is the kind of solution proposed to deal with the gaps in
agreement. Bobaljik & Branigan (2006) account for the Chukchi data by post-
syntactic operations in a DistributedMorphology framework. By deleting cer-
tain bundles of features, problematic conﬁgurations are ‘repaired’, so to speak.
A similar concept is proposed by Béjar & Rezac (2009) and adopted here. A
crucial difference is that Béjar & Rezac argue for a syntactic repair mechan-
ism, namely during the syntactic derivation, not following it.
Béjar & Rezac’s (2009) idea, to be discussed in more detail below, is that
inverse conﬁgurations trigger some special process in several unrelated lan-
guages. Béjar &Rezac (2009: 55ff.) argue that the strategies with which these
configurations can be repaired are also similar across languages. One of these
strategies is adding a second probe to value features of the external argument
in inverse conﬁgurations. This is shown in (14), where inverse conﬁgurations
have an additional agreement slot.
(14) a. k-see
1-see
‘I see him.’
b. wa-k-see
3.INV-1-see
‘He sees me.’
(Béjar & Rezac 2009: 59)
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Crucially, additional agreement like wa- in (14b) only appears in inverse con-
texts. An alternative strategy, instantiated by Kashmiri, is a special case on
the pronominal direct object which only appears in inverse contexts. This
case is homophonous with the dative but is a distinct case (cf. Béjar & Rezac
2009: 64ff. for discussion). In light of this, the appearance of the preﬁx ine-
in Chukchi, shown above, can be taken to be a repair strategy as well.
I will invoke this notion of repair strategy as used by Béjar & Rezac (2009)
to account for the appearance of the subjective paradigm in inverse conﬁgur-
ations in Hungarian below. To begin with, I will briefly discuss the analysis
of inverse agreement in Hungarian as proposed by É. Kiss (2003, 2005, 2013)
and illustrate the distribution of the Hungarian verb paradigms with respect to
personal pronoun direct objects in the light of inverse and non-inverse con-
ﬁgurations of external and internal argument.
2.2 É. Kiss on inverse agreement
É. Kiss (2003, 2005) suggests the connection between agreement in Hungarian
and Chukchi that I have just discussed. She illustrates the similarities between
the patterns in the languages and suggests that an ancient Sprachbund might
have helped spread an inverse agreement constraint from Chukchi and its rel-
atives to Hungarian (and potentially other Uralic and Finno-Ugric languages).
In É. Kiss (2013), she provides a motivation for this constraint, namely that
in present-day Hungarian it is due to fossilised constraints based on primary
and secondary topicality. She follows Dalrymple & Nikolaeva (2011) in ar-
guing that topicality is involved in object marking in a range of languages and
argues that the present-day Hungarian system is due to a constraint ruling out
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agreement with an object that is more topical than the subject, again following
a scale like (10).
While this motivation is plausible, it seems to rely on the notion of “inherent
topicality” (É. Kiss 2013: 15) of ﬁrst and second person pronouns and topic-
ality, as well a very close link between topicality, animacy and speciﬁcity: É.
Kiss (2013: 16) writes that objects (secondary topics) are ruled out that are
“more topical (in other words, more animate, more speciﬁc)” than the sub-
ject (the primary topic). Topicality, however, while showing a tendency to go
with animate and speciﬁc (or deﬁnite) noun phrases, is an independent notion:
first and second person pronouns can obviously be in focus and non-topical,
while retaining their properties of animacy and specificity (cf. Dalrymple &
Nikolaeva 2011 for a wide range of examples illustrating this with different
kinds of noun phrases).
Coppock &Wechsler (2010: 177f.) criticise É. Kiss’ (2005) approach along
several lines: for example, they argue that the objective paradigm is “for the
most part only conditioned by the features of the object” and that “[t]he use of
the objective conjugation is not conditioned by the subject’s person value or
indeed any other properties of the subject; only -lak/-lek is sensitive to both
the subject and object.” (p. 177). This depends on one’s perspective, however:
in the system proposed here, the features of both the subject and the object are
relevant for determining the spell-out of verbmorphology, a property Coppock
& Wechsler (2010: 177) attribute to “true inverse systems”.
In what follows, I develop an approach to the inverse agreement patterns
that is based on truly inherent properties of personal pronouns, namely their
person (and deﬁniteness) features, making the appearance of agreement in-
dependent of information structure. Arguably, this is a simpler approach to
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the system in present-day Hungarian that the one proposed by É. Kiss (2013)
and potentially avoids some of the criticisms just alluded to and others, like
the reliance on a person hierarchy, as criticised by den Dikken (2006: 18, fn.
34), which is replaced by reference to syntactic properties of the arguments
involved in Agree.
2.3 A closer look at agreement patterns
As shown above, when restricting direct objects to personal pronouns, both
the subjective and the objective paradigm can appear on the verb. The choice
of paradigm is not random, however: with third person personal pronoun ob-
jects, the verb is always in the objective paradigm. With ﬁrst person pronoun
objects, the verb is always in the subjective paradigm. It is with second per-
son pronoun objects, that the person of the subject becomes relevant: with a
ﬁrst person subject, the verb shows the sufﬁx -lak/-lek ‘1SG>2’, whereas with
a third person subject, the verb is in the subjective paradigm. Given the previ-
ous discussion, describing the distribution of the verb paradigms is straightfor-
ward: the subjective paradigm appears with personal pronoun direct objects
if the two arguments are in an inverse conﬁguration.
The data can thus be grouped as follows: in inverse contexts, i.e. 2, 3 > 1,
we see the subjective paradigm, whereas in non-inverse contexts, i.e. 1, 2, 3
> 3 and 1 > 2, we see the objective paradigm (cf. also Table 1 and Béjar &
Rezac 2009: 54, Table 5).
As mentioned above, analysing the Hungarian agreement patterns in this
way follows insights by É. Kiss who ﬁrst suggested that the notion of inverse
agreement might play a role in the lack of agreement with ﬁrst and second
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EA → IA 1 2 3
1 OBJ OBJ
2 SUBJ OBJ
3 SUBJ SUBJ OBJ
Table 1 Distribution of verb paradigms with personal pronoun direct objects.
Shaded cells show inverse conﬁgurations.
person pronouns. In what follows, I present a feature-based analysis following
Béjar & Rezac (2009).
2.4 Interim summary
The discussion up to this point has illustrated the distribution of the two Hun-
garian verb paradigms with respect to personal pronoun direct objects in terms
of the notion of inverse agreement. In the following section, I will propose
an account as to why the distribution is the way it is, i.e. why the subjective
paradigm appears in inverse conﬁgurations.
3 Object agreement and inverse conﬁgurations
The approach to the distribution of the Hungarian objective paradigm with
respect to personal pronouns in this paper differs crucially frommost previous
ones in a crucial respect. As mentioned above, it is often assumed that ﬁrst
and second person pronouns lack a certain property which gives rise to the
objective paradigm while third person pronouns have it (cf. the discussion
above and Bartos 1999, Coppock & Wechsler 2010, Coppock 2013). In
this section, I will argue that it is not necessary to assume any differences in
the personal pronouns when it comes to triggering the objective paradigm,
because the distribution of the paradigms can be shown to follow from the
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mechanism of Agree involved in establishing the licensing of arguments and
agreement in Hungarian.
Important evidence for this suggestion comes from second person pronouns.
Since, on the perspective I am taking here, these do trigger the objective
paradigm when subject and object are in a direct conﬁguration, the presence
of the -lak/-lek sufﬁx comes ‘for free’ as part of regular object agreement and
does not have to be stipulated. In the following section, I will develop an ac-
count of how the nature of personal pronouns can derive both the presence and
the lack of agreement in the patterns that I have just described.
3.1 The nature of person features
In this paper, I will assume that the person hierarchy shown in (10) above
illustrates a series of entailment relations. On this view, each level on the
hierarchy is not a primitive notion but each person is made up of distinct fea-
ture speciﬁcations (cf. Harley & Ritter 2002, Adger & Harbour 2007, Béjar
& Rezac 2009 for proposals along these lines). I will adopt the feature spe-
ciﬁcations proposed by Béjar & Rezac (2009), according to which a level on
the hierarchy can be speciﬁed for [speaker], [participant] and a generic person
feature called []. I will add an additional feature below to account for the
Hungarian data. The entailment relations between the person speciﬁcations
can thus be illustrated as in Table 2, cf. Béjar & Rezac (2009: 43).
1st 2nd 3rd[speaker][participant] [participant][] [] []
Table 2 Possible feature specification of pronouns.
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Table 2 shows that ﬁrst person can be analysed as consisting of the features
[speaker], [participant] and [] ([S], [P], and [] below), a proper superset
of the features making up second and third person. The features making up
ﬁrst person thus entail the presence of the features making up other person
speciﬁcations.
3.2 Inverse vs. non-inverse cases
Establishing this notion of person speciﬁcation makes it possible to give an ac-
count of the differences in agreement between inverse and non-inverse cases.
Following Béjar & Rezac (2009) I will illustrate object agreement in Hun-
garian using themechanism ofCyclic Agree. In Béjar&Rezac’s (2009) frame-
work, a probe enters an Agree relation with its internal argument ﬁrst and can
go on to enter a second Agree relation with the external argument under cer-
tain conditions, namely if not all features on the probe have been valued by
the ﬁrst cycle of Agree. (15) is an illustration of this for a Hungarian example
like (16), using the features introduced above. The representation of Agree in
(15) and below follow Béjar & Rezac (2009).
(15) 1 → 3: OBJ
EA v IA
 [u] 
P [u3]
S [u6]
(16) Lát-om
see-1SG.OBJ
ő-t.
s/he-ACC
‘I see him/her.’
In (15), a verbal probe, v by assumption, enters into a ﬁrst Agree relation with
its direct object. It only values the feature [u] so the features [uP], [uS] are left
unvalued on the probe (indicated by bold face). This makes the probe extend
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its search space (cf. Béjar & Rezac 2009: 49) and look for further candidates.
The external argument is available to value these features in a second cycle.
Thus, the two arguments value a single probe together. This, I argue, is spelled
out as the objective paradigm in (16).
In inverse cases, when the ﬁrst argument — the internal argument or dir-
ect object — has a superset of features of the subject (i.e. it is higher on the
hierarchy in (10)), all the features that the external argument could value have
already been valued in the ﬁrst cycle of Agree, see (17) for illustration.
(17) 2 → 1: SUBJ?
EA v IA
 [u] 
P [uP] P
[uS] S
(18) Lát-sz
see-2SG.SUBJ
engem.
I.ACC
‘You see me.’
There is no immediate problem with the conﬁguration in (17) per se, but Béjar
& Rezac (2009: 46) argue that conﬁgurations like (17) are ruled out by their
Person-Licensing Condition (PLC), which states that “[a] -feature [F] must
be licensed by Agree of some segment in a feature structure of which [F] is
a subset.” For present purposes, this means that the external argument must
enter an Agree relation with the probe. In (17), the lack of such a relation
between the external argument and the probe would lead to a violation of the
PLC.
In order to resolve the licensing issue in (17) (and analogous conﬁgurations
in other languages), Béjar & Rezac (2009) argue that languages have repair
strategies at their disposal to ﬁx conﬁgurations that would lead to a crash of
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the derivation. One such strategy is to merge an additional probe in exactly
those contexts where licensing of the subject would otherwise fail.
For Hungarian, the idea that a second probe is available which only agrees
with the subject in inverse conﬁgurations can provide an explanation for why
only the subjective paradigm appears in these contexts. Cyclic Agree thus
allows us to broadly generalise over inverse and non-inverse contexts: in the
latter, a single probe agrees with both the internal and the external argument
— this is spelled out as the objective paradigm, showing overt reference to
properties of both subject and object. In the former, inverse cases, there is no
single probe which agrees with both arguments.
If there are two probes involved in inverse conﬁgurations, why would only
one be spelled out? This might be a matter of cross-linguistic variation, some
languages spelling out both, some only the higher probe (cf. Béjar & Rezac
2009: 57), or related to the fact that there are simply no morphemes in Hun-
garian that spell out reference to properties of the direct object only (while
there are suffixes indicating subject agreement only). I leave the details of the
nature of the second probe mostly open in this paper; I will assume that it is
T (cf. É. Kiss 2008 for recent discussion of verb movement in Hungarian; the
probe might move to T after the first cycle of Agree).7
The representation of the probes involved in spelling out the subjective
paradigm in an inverse context like (18) is arguably as in (19), then:
(19) 3 → 1: SUBJ
7What consequences this has for the nature of the relevant probes in Hungarian is question
I will to leave open at this point. T is a reasonable candidate for a second probe, given
what is generally suggested about subject agreement cross-linguistically. I thank Theresa
Biberauer and Ian Roberts for discussion of this point.
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EA T v IA
 [u] [u] 
[uP] P
[uS] S
To summarise this section, the following preliminary generalisations can ac-
count for the relation between verb paradigms and inverse/non-inverse con-
texts in Hungarian:
(20) Non-inverse conﬁgurations: When a verbal probe enters Agree re-
lations with both the direct object and the subject, the verb is in the
objective paradigm.8
(21) Inverse conﬁgurations: In inverse cases, a separate probe enters an
Agree relation with the subject only, and this is spelled out as the
subjective paradigm.
Briefly: these generalisations implicitly claim that object agreement does arise
with ﬁrst and second person pronouns across the board; it is just not spelled out
in inverse cases. This is a possible reason for why the direct object personal
pronouns which are highest in hierarchies like (10) give rise to unexpected ‘in-
transitive’ agreement. In addition, this suggestion does not posit (syntactic)
differences between ﬁrst and (some) second person pronouns, on the one hand,
and third person pronouns on the other and treats the -lak/-lek sufﬁx as a reg-
ular sufﬁx of the objective paradigm, while taking the person of the subject
into account.
8See a qualiﬁcation of this generalisation in section 4.3.2.
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4 Analysis: deriving the correct paradigm
4.1 The role of object agreement
As just mentioned, the system proposed above allows us to analyse all personal
pronouns as having the property which triggers the objective paradigm. This
is a crucial difference from analyses of the objective paradigm such as Bartos
(1999), Coppock & Wechsler (2012) and Coppock (2013). So far, however,
the role of this property in the agreement system introduced above is unclear.
I will assume here that, whatever the exact property that triggers the object-
ive paradigm is, it is part of the Agree system, thus visible for the probe that
agrees with the object. In fact, I will argue that it is only this property which
makes the object visible for the verbal probe, to account for the fact that not
all direct objects trigger agreement (trivially: those that lack the property of
triggering object agreement do not).
I will call the relevant feature [D], reminiscent of ‘deﬁniteness’, Bartos’
(1999) DP, and Coppock’s (2013) DEF — properties of direct object noun
phrases that have been claimed to trigger object agreement. For reasons of
space, the exact nature of this feature can not be dealt with here, but by the
nature of the current approach [D] can be read as a variable over approaches
to Hungarian object agreement: if the Agree mechanism proposed above is
correct, the distribution of paradigms will follow for the personal pronouns,
as long as Agree is involved.9
9Coppock’s (2013) proposal rules out agreement with ﬁrst and second person pronouns ex-
plicitly, due to the indexicality of these pronouns. Given this, Coppock’s semantic as-
sumptions should not be compatible with the system I propose here. In section 4.4.3, I
discuss some examples which might be problematic for the suggestion that indexicality
rules out agreement.
20
Not all direct objects trigger agreement, so the probe has to be sensitive to
the feature [D], and agreement only arises when it is present. This variation in
the presence or absence of [D] gives rise to the particular kind of differential
object marking (DOM) that Hungarian exhibits.
Because of the widespread cross-linguistic support for one-directional en-
tailment relations between personal pronouns, with either ﬁrst or second per-
son being more speciﬁed than third person (as above), and the usual behaviour
of personal pronouns in DOM (cf. i.a. Silverstein 1976, Aissen 2003), I will
assume that if third person personal pronouns have the [D] feature, ﬁrst and
second person pronouns also have it. I briefly mentioned this above: this
explicitly means that ﬁrst and second person pronouns would trigger object
agreement, were it not for the mechanisms of Cyclic Agree which prevent its
spell-out.
On the current perspective, all noun phrases that do not trigger object agree-
ment are thus third person, i.e. third person is the only person that can lack [D].
The feature speciﬁcations shown in Table 2 above can be modiﬁed as shown
in Table 3, where third person only varies with respect to having [D] or not —
it has been suggested elsewhere that being inanimate or indefinite is a property
of third person noun phrases, cf. e.g. Adger & Harbour (2007) and Richards
(2008) for similar views on entailment relations between person, animacy and
deﬁniteness. Third person falls into two classes: those which trigger object
agreement by virtue of having [D], and those which do not by lacking [D]. This
feature is grey in Table 3 because of asymmetries between subject and object
to be discussed below.
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1st 2nd 3rd.D 3rd[speaker][participant] [participant][] [] [] []
[D] [D] [D]
Table 3 Distribution of features making up ﬁrst, second and third person in
Hungarian.
Similarly, I will assume the verbal probe in Hungarian to have an unval-
ued feature [uD], giving rise to the following representations of a non-inverse
conﬁguration, (22), and an inverse conﬁguration, (23).
(22) 1 → 3.D: OBJ
EA v IA
D [uD] D
 [u] 
P [u3]
S [u6]
(23) Lát-om
see-1SG.OBJ
ő-t.
s/he-ACC
‘I see him/her.’
(24) 2 → 1: SUBJ
EA T v IA
D [uD] [uD] D
 [u] [u] 
P [uS] [uP] P
[uS] S
(25) Lát-sz
see-2SG.SUBJ
engem.
I.ACC
‘You see me.’
Adding [D] to the person speciﬁcations does not change anything about the
system as introduced so far but it makes it possible to account for why objects
lacking [D] do not trigger agreement: they are simply invisible to the probe and
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only subject agreement will be spelled out. This accounts for why indeﬁnite
noun phrases, for example, do not trigger any agreement (cf. (1)). I now turn
to a problem that the current approach runs into.
4.2 A problem: 3 → 3.D agreement
The mechanism discussed so far does not yet explain why conﬁgurations with
a third person subject and a third person object would trigger object agree-
ment. A direct object like ő-t ‘s/he-ACC’ is speciﬁed as [D], [], which is in
any case a superset of the speciﬁcation of a third person subject which is either
the same or simply [] (given that a set is always a superset of itself). This is
exactly the kind of conﬁguration which would fully value the probe and lead
to a repair strategy, as shown above. We might expect 3→ 3 conﬁgurations to
trigger the subjective paradigm, but this is not what happens. In this section,
I will propose that this situation does not arise because the probe is sensit-
ive to distinctive properties on the goals in its domain. In addition, different
properties of the arguments are relevant to the probe in question.
The problem of 3 → 3 agreement can be solved by assuming that the probe
will use the minimal set of features it needs to completely identify the person
of a goal. Since [], the generic person feature, is part of all four different
feature speciﬁcations, the probe cannot use it to identify the person of the goal.
However, for a third person noun phrase that has [D], the presence of [D] and
no other (higher) feature will sufﬁce to exhaustively identify the person of
the goal and [] is ignored. This leads to a representation like the one shown
in (26). The probe merely agrees with the object in [D], ignoring [], so the
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probe can enter the second Agree relation with the subject, giving rise to the
objective paradigm, as in (27).10
(26) 3 → 3.D: OBJ
EA v IA
D [uD] D
 [u] 
[u3]
[u6]
(27) Lát-ja
see-3SG.OBJ
ő-t.
s/he-ACC
‘S/he sees him/her.’
Still, [D] is not quite like the other features in that it is only relevant on the
direct object in Hungarian. This can be seen from the fact that spelling out
agreement with the subject is never sensitive to the same properties which are
involved in object agreement: subjects trigger agreement in any case. This is a
reason for [D] being grey in Table 3. It does not seem to be relevant for spelling
out subject agreement, but only for agreement between verb and object.
4.3 Deriving the agreement patterns
If the above is correct, we are in a position to derive the relevant verb para-
digms in both inverse and non-inverse patterns. In this section, I illustrate how
the generalisations in (20) and (21) still characterise the underlying system of
Agree.
As argued above, if the probe is satisﬁed by theminimal feature speciﬁcation
that allows it to identify an argument unambiguously, it will sufﬁce to recog-
nise [D] (and nothing else) for third person noun phrases triggering agreement,
10As (26) also shows, the derivation does not fail if there are unvalued features left on the
probe. Adopting the system of Agree argued for by Preminger (2011, in press), this is not
a problem.
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as well as [P] (and nothing else) for second person arguments, and [S] for ﬁrst
person arguments. Crucially, because of the entailment relations between fea-
tures [S] entails the presence of [P] and [D], and [P] in turn entails the pres-
ence of [] and [D] (but because of its exceptional status, [D] does not entail
anything, just like []). The representation of inverse conﬁgurations and the
resulting agreement is shown in (28) and (31) below.
(28) 3 → 1: SUBJ
EA T v IA
(D) [uD] [uD] D
 [u] [u] 
[uP] P
[uS] S
With ﬁrst person objects, the probe will always be fully valued after the ﬁrst
cycle of Agree, so subject agreement will be with a second probe. With second
person objects, the probe has an unvalued [u6] feature after the ﬁrst cycle, as
shown in (29). Depending on the person of the subject, this unvalued feature
is either valued on the same probe (with a ﬁrst person subject), see (30), or
the subject cannot be licensed through Agree with the ﬁrst probe (with a third
person subject), see (31).
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(29) ? → 2
EA v IA
[uD] D
[u] 
[uP] P
[u6]
(30) 1 → 2: OBJ
EA v IA
D [uD] D
 [u] 
P [uP] P
S [u6]
(31) 3 → 2: SUBJ
EA T v IA
(D) [uD] [uD] D
 [u] [u] 
[uP] P
[u6]
(30) involves a single probe and is spelled out as the objective paradigm,
whereas (31) involves an additional probe which is the only one spelled out,
in the subjective paradigm. Note that the second person pronoun object be-
haves in exactly the same way in both cases, it is the feature speciﬁcation of
the subject which makes a difference for the spell-out of verb morphology.
4.3.1 A brief note on plurals
So far, all the examples I have discussed have included singular pronouns.
There is one conﬁguration for which the present system predicts the wrong
paradigm, namely 1.PL → 2, as shown in (32).
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(32) 1.3/ → 2.6*: 68%-
a. Lát-unk
see-1PL.SUBJ
téged.
you-SG.ACC
‘We see you (sg.).’
1.3/ → 2.3/: 68%-
b. Lát-unk
see-1PL.SUBJ
titek-et.
you.PL-ACC
‘We see you (pl.).’
The conﬁgurations in (32) are predicted to trigger the objective paradigm, if
the set of features making up ﬁrst person is a proper superset of the features
making up second person. It seems, however, that ﬁrst person plural differs
from ﬁrst person singular. This is not completely unexpected in the present
system if one of the differences between ﬁrst person singular and plural is the
relevance of the participant feature, a natural assumption given the nature of
ﬁrst person plural, including other participants apart from the speaker. Given
that ﬁrst person plural does not indicate a plurality of speakers, it seems pos-
sible that plurality in ﬁrst person plural (as well as second person plural) is
different from third person. In a feature geometric approach to pronouns such
as Harley & Ritter (2002), one way of implementing this would be to specify
the ﬁrst person feature for plural pronouns together with number, i.e. outside
the domain of features visible for the verbal probe (as a speciﬁcation on the
INDV node, for readers familiar with Harley & Ritter 2002). Second person
and ﬁrst person plural objects would look identical to the verb, which is in-
sensitive to number, and ﬁrst person singular would still be the most highly
speciﬁed pronoun. Also note that the number of the object otherwise does not
play a role for the appearance of the objective paradigm.
4.3.2 Potential problems?
An anonymous reviewer mentions configurations involving the same person,
e.g. 1 → 1, 2 → 2 as in (33) and (34), in addition to 3 → 3.
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(33) ?Engem
I.ACC
választ-ott-unk /
elect-PAST-1PL.SUBJ
*választ-ott-uk
elect-PAST-1PL.OBJ
meg
PRF
elnök-nek.
president-DAT
(?) ‘We elected me president.’
(34) ?Téged
you.ACC
jelöl-t-etek /
nominate-PAST-2PL.SUBJ
*jelöl-t-étek
nominate-PAST-2PL.OBJ
meg
PRF
képviselő-nek.
representative-DAT
(?) ‘Did youPL nominate youSG as representative?’
The reviewer points out that given the generalisation in (20), we should
see the objective paradigm in (33) and (34), as in other non-inverse cases.
The generalisation does in fact make that prediction, the system implemented
later, however, does not. In the actual implementation of Agree, 3 → 3 is
treated differently from 1 → 1 and 2 → 2, because a third person pronoun
is argued to value only D but no other features. Second (and ﬁrst) person
objects on the other hand value the features P and S and their entailments,
respectively, as shown in (35) and (36) (cf. also (29)-(31) above). Thus, the
present system actually derives the patterns in (33) and (34) as it stands. Note
further that potential changes to the feature specifications of 1PL as discussed
in section 4.3.1 would not alter this result.
(35) 1.PL → 1.SG: SUBJ
EA T v IA
(D) [uD] [uD] D
 [u] [u] 
P [uP] [uP] P
S [uS] [uS] P
(36) 2 → 2: SUBJ
EA T v IA
(D) [uD] [uD] D
 [u] [u] 
P [uP] [uP] P
[u6]
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Katalin É. Kiss (p.c.) mentions a further restriction on configurations in-
volving the same person. In (35) and (36), the subject is plural, while the
object is singular. É. Kiss (2013) discusses examples in which the subject is
singular, but the object is plural, and both arguments are first person, cf. (37).
(37) Én
I
minket
us.ACC
is
also
?belevesz-em /
include-1SG.OBJ
*belevesz-ek
include-1SG.SUBJ
a
the
névsor-ba.
namelist-into
‘I also include us into the list of names.’ (É. Kiss 2013: 6)
Given the modifications of first person plural features suggested above,
this configuration is also derived by Cyclic Agree.11 Cases involving second
person on both arguments do not follow from the present system, however.
É. Kiss provides (38), showing that singular subject and plural object lead to
the objective paradigm, while plural subject and singular object give rise to
the subjective paradigm.
(38) a. Ti
you.PL
téged
you.SG.ACC
jelöl-tök /
nominate-2PL.SUBJ
*jelöl-itek.
nominate-2PL.OBJ
‘You (pl.) nominate you (sg.).’
b. Te
you.SG
titeket
you.PL.ACC
jelöl-öd /
nominate-2SG.OBJ
*jelöl-sz.
nominate-2SG.SUBJ
‘You (sg.) nominate you (pl.).’ (Katalin É. Kiss, p.c.)
É. Kiss further reminds me that Comrie’s original hierarchy accounts for
similar patterns in Chukchi and related languages (though Comrie does not
apply this to Hungarian). A more elaborate hierarchy corresponds, in present
terms, to different feature specifications giving rise to different subset relations
11While the appearance of the objective paradigm follows, the form of its exponent does not.
Given that I have argued that the objective paradigm is agreement with the person of the
object, one might be surprised to see the same suffix appear with first (and second) person
plural objects as with third person objects. I have to leave this issue unresolved.
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between them. I cannot attempt to sketch such an account here and I do not
have a principled explanation for these patterns at this point.
4.4 What the present analysis can and cannot do
In this section,12 I briefly state some general properties of the analysis I have
just presented and how it relates to other analyses of the same data, also dis-
cussing some potential counterexamples. Most of the points addressed here
concern the nature of the suffix -lak/-lek, its structure and its relation to the
objective paradigm.
4.4.1 Agreement in person
I have argued above, on distributional grounds, that it is possible to include
the -lak/-lek suffix in the objective paradigm; this has played a crucial role
in the later analysis, where the Hungarian object agreement is argued to be
triggered by all second and first person pronoun objects. A reviewer argues,
however, that whereas the “genuine” objective paradigm is sensitive to “some
property of the object nominal other than its phi-features”, -lak/-lek references
person speciﬁcally. Presumably, the “genuine” objective paradigm referred to
here is restricted to third person. Once we adopt the perspective that second
person objects are included, the objective paradigm is always sensitive to the
person of its object (though not its number). Third and second person pronoun
objects are then similar in that the objective paradigm references some non-
phi property as well as their person features. The non-phi property in question
would be the feature [D].
12Thanks to two anonymous reviewers prompting me to add this section.
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4.4.2 A note on morphology
There are certain aspects of the morphology of the objective paradigm and
Hungarian personal pronouns that I have not discussed. First, as den Dikken
(2004, 2006) inter alios points out in some detail, the structure of ﬁrst and
second person pronouns in their accusative forms differs from third person
accusative personal pronouns. While third person ő takes the regular accusat-
ive -t, accusative ﬁrst and second person pronouns differ from their nominative
counterparts as follows:
(39) én
I (NOM)
engem
me (ACC)
(40) te
you (NOM)
téged
you (ACC)
Den Dikken (2004, 2006) analyses these forms as including the possessive
endings -em and -ed, indicating a ﬁrst and second person possessor, respect-
ively. On his analysis, (39) and (40) behave like other possessed noun phrases
which have the same structure. Furthermore, den Dikken (2004, 2006), Bar-
tos (1999) and Rebrus (2000) analyse the sufﬁx -lak/-lek as consisting of a
segment -l- indicating second person, an epenthetic vowel, as well as a seg-
ment -k indicating ﬁrst person in the subjective paradigm. Den Dikken relates
the complex sufﬁx -lak/-lek and the possessive structure of the second person
pronouns by arguing for the cliticisation of -l- from the possessor position of
the pronoun onto the verb.13
The present analysis has taken a different route: I take the -lak/-lek sufﬁx to
be not substantially different from sufﬁxes agreeing with third person objects.
In the analysis introduced above, the suffixes are treated as portmanteaus with
respect to the syntactic computation, the objective paradigm being spelled out
13See den Dikken (2004: 489, note 1) for a brief history of -l- and den Dikken (2006: 17, fn.
33) for some qualifying statements on its nature.
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exactly when two arguments value the features of one probe. An anonymous
reviewer argues that it is curious to analyse the arguably most clearly seg-
mentable verbal afﬁx as a portmanteau and that this comes “at a cost”, namely
the lack of segmentability of the suffix -lak/-lek. This is a valid point, but
the present system gives rise to a simpler analysis of the general agreement
pattern.14
The claim is not that dissecting -lak/-lek into smaller parts is irrelevant: the
point is that for the syntax, analysing the sufﬁx as complex might not lead to
additional insights into the agreement system. In addition, I have analysed
the pronouns engem ‘me’ and téged ‘you (ACC)’ simply as being the (pos-
sibly suppletive, cf. Dékány 2011: 229) accusative forms of én ‘I.NOM’ and
te ‘you.NOM’, respectively, and the present analysis does not reference any
smaller parts of their structure (see again den Dikken 2004, 2006 for detailed
accounts of how they could be decomposed; cf. also Rocquet 2013). For reas-
ons of space, I cannot go into more detail here.
To summarise briefly, it is necessary to state that morphological segmenta-
tion of sufﬁxes is something the present analysis cannot do, as all sufﬁxes of
the objective paradigm are treated as monomorphemic in the syntactic deriva-
tion. It seems to me that unless the syntax references the segments explicitly,
the current view is plausible.
4.4.3 Are ﬁrst and second person different from third person?
As pointed out above, from the perspective endorsed in this paper, i.e. that
the objective paradigm indicates agreement in person (and deﬁniteness), the
14In contrast, den Dikken (2004, 2006), for example, argues for a number of overt and covert
subject and object clitics; one of these, the -l- clitic referencing second person has a null
allomorph when the subject is not first person (den Dikken 2006: 18). If there are separate
clitics for singular and plural second person objects, this system gives rise to two object
clitics with the exponent -l- when the subject is first person, as well as at least two more
clitics with zero exponents for second person objects when the subject is not first person.
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presence of -lak/-lek on the verb follows as a case of agreement with second
person. On the assumption that the objective paradigm is only sensitive to
third person objects, however, this sufﬁx has to be accounted for in a different
way (or stipulated) and the lack of agreement with ﬁrst person subjects is not
problematic: agreement is only with third person.
Bartos (1999), for example, assumes that object agreement is a general prop-
erty that is not restricted to third person. But he argues that ﬁrst and second
person pronouns are NumPs and thus lack the syntactic structure that triggers
the objective paradigm, namely DP. Third person personal pronoun objects,
however, do project a DP and do trigger the objective paradigm. On this ac-
count, the sufﬁx -lak/-lek is somewhat mysterious, and the syntactic evidence
for the difference between ﬁrst and second person pronouns, on the one hand,
and third person pronouns on the other, is relatively sparse (but see some very
interesting arguments in den Dikken 2004). In contrast, in the semantic ap-
proach proposed by Coppock (2013), ﬁrst and second person pronouns differ
from third person pronouns in not being anaphoric but purely indexical, and
thus not triggering the objective paradigm (anaphoricity being the relevant
trigger). This provides an account for the lack of agreement with ﬁrst and
second person pronouns, apart from the nature of -lak/-lek (thanks to an an-
onymous reviewer for pointing out the need to clarify these issues).
As Coppock (2013: 369) argues, this allows her approach to “[capture] the
person sensitivity—and the exception involving reflexives and reciprocals—
using the same principle that is used to account for all of the other distribu-
tional properties of the objective conjugation.” This is true. As a consequence,
if one aims at analysing -lak/-lek as part of the objective paradigm, as in
the present approach, one should provide evidence that second person pro-
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nouns are similar to third person pronouns in the relevant, i.e. syntactic and
semantic, respects. One way of arguing for this is via the existence of bound
variable readings for ﬁrst and second person pronouns, as discussed by Rull-
man (2004) and Kratzer (2009), for example. Crucially, in certain contexts,
ﬁrst and second person pronouns give rise to interpretations that are not index-
ical (or deictic) but which can be analysed as bound, cf. (41), modeled after
examples in Rullman 2004.
(41) a. Csak
only
te
you
hisz-ed,
believe-2SG.OBJ
hogy
that
téged
you.ACC
fog-lak
will-1SG>2
megválaszta-ni.
vote.for-INF
‘Only you believe that I will vote for you.’
b. Csak
only
te
you
hisz-ed,
believe-2SG.OBJ
hogy
that
téged
you.ACC
fog-nak
will-3SG.SUBJ
megválaszta-ni.
vote.for-INF
‘Only you believe that they are going to vote for you.’
While both of these examples have a reading in which te ‘you’ and téged
‘you.ACC’ refer to the addressee, they also give rise to readings which express
that the addressee is the only person who has the property that x[x believes
that I/they will vote for x] (cf. Rullman 2004: 160). That such readings exist
shows that not all occurrences of ﬁrst and second person pronouns (examples
with ﬁrst person are not shown but they are analogous) are indexical, but that
they may be bound. On the bound readings, then, these pronouns do have
antecedents of a similar kind that reflexives have, which Coppock (2013: 356)
seems to analyse as requiring the objective paradigm under similar conditions.
As indicated in (41a) and (41b), the choice of subject, third vs. ﬁrst person,
respectively, correlates with the absence and presence of -lak/-lek, as in pre-
vious examples, where the second person objects were indexical. Indexicality
itself does not seem to cause differences in agreement in all cases, then.
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Formal second person pronouns likeÖn ‘you.SG (formal)’ provide a further
test for the indexicality hypothesis. Ön has a singular second person referent,
the addressee, and while be used in bound contexts such as (41) as well, its
non-bound use is indexical, just like non-bound uses of first and second person
pronouns. However, it requires third person subject agreement and invariably
triggers (third person) object agreement when it is the direct object, cf. (42).
(42) Lát-om/*-ok
see-1SG.OBJ/*-1SG.SUBJ
Ön-t.
you.SG-ACC
‘I see you (sg.).’ (formal)
I take this to suggest as well that indexicality does not necessarily rule out
(or trigger) the appearance of object agreement. Rather, the formal feature
specification of personal pronouns visible to the syntax seems to influence the
choice of paradigm.
This is in line with the system introduced in this section; the data presented
here provide additional evidence that it is plausible to assume that a shared
(syntactic) property of all personal pronouns triggers the objective paradigm.
4.5 Interim summary
In this section, I proposed a mechanism based on Béjar & Rezac’s (2009)
Cyclic Agree which derives the distribution of the subjective and objective
paradigms in Hungarian with personal pronoun direct objects. Because of
the behaviour of second person pronoun direct objects which trigger different
verb paradigms based on the person of the subject, I assume that all personal
pronouns exhibit the same behaviour with respect to verb paradigms, namely
that they all have the property which triggers object agreement, called [D] here.
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The reasonwhy the objective paradigm does not arise with personal pronoun
direct objects lies in the nature of inverse conﬁgurations and repair strategies,
attested in unrelated languages. The way in which agreement in inverse con-
ﬁgurations is expressed morphosyntactically in Hungarian— intransitive verb
morphology despite a highly prominent direct object— is also attested in other
languages, cf. the discussion of Chukchi above.
One respect in which Hungarian differs from the languages discussed above
which also show inverse agreement effects is that Hungarian only has object
agreement with a proper subset of direct objects due to the presence or absence
of the feature [D]. This introduces an asymmetry between subjects and objects
which arguably provides an explanation for why the conﬁguration of third
person subject and third person direct object with [D] does not count as an
instance of inverse agreement.
5 Conclusions
In this paper, I have argued for a novel approach to certain gaps in the distri-
bution of the objective paradigm in Hungarian, namely with ﬁrst and second
person pronoun direct objects. In most of the previous literature, the failure
of ﬁrst and some second person pronoun direct objects to trigger object agree-
ment has been analysed merely with respect to the direct object.
Following É. Kiss (2013), however, I argued that it is crucial to take the
person of the subject into account. Important evidence for this comes from
second person pronoun objects which trigger agreement with a ﬁrst person
subject, but not with a third person subject. I diverge from É. Kiss’s ana-
lysis by taking the formal features of the arguments but not their information
structural properties to be relevant. I have attempted to model this using the
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system of Cyclic Agree proposed by Béjar & Rezac (2009) which provides a
principled explanation for why the unexpected morphosyntactic expression of
certain direct objects would appear in inverse contexts in particular. I provided
some typological evidence to frame the discussion which shows that the gap
in Hungarian agreement is not unusual typologically.
There are two main positive consequences of the current approach: ﬁrst,
it does away with syntactic differences between ﬁrst and second person pro-
nouns, on the one hand, and third person personal pronouns on the other. I
think that an approach that treats personal pronouns consistently along these
lines potentially gives rise to a simpler system than one deriving the presence
of -lak/-lek and the lack of agreement with ﬁrst person pronouns by differ-
ent means. The proposed analysis derives this distribution from the feature
specifications of the pronouns and the mechanism of Agree.
Second, the current approach makes it possible to analyse Hungarian as
showing a regular instance of differential object marking: in languages in
which deﬁniteness plays a role in DOM, personal pronouns would be expected
to trigger differential marking. If the current proposal is correct, Hungarian
can be said to adhere to this cross-linguistically widespread pattern in prin-
ciple, with the actual expression of differential marking being overridden by
the mechanics of agreement under conditions which can be precisely stated
and which are familiar from other languages.
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